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Over 330 million people live in India’s cities; 35 cities have a population of over a 
million and three (Mumbai, Delhi, and Kolkata) of the 10 largest metropolises in the world 
are in India. India’s cities are large, economically important, and growing.  However, 
neither urban infrastructure nor the level of urban public services is adequate for current 
needs, let alone to meet growing demands. Dealing with this problem is a   formidable 
challenge. Not only must adequate finance for the provision of services be found but it is 
critical to ensure that the money spent results in desired outputs and outcomes. To do so, 
local governance structures also need to be reformed and  strengthened. This paper 
attempts to point the way towards some possible solutions by  analysing urban 
governance and finance in India in the context of lessons drawn from  fiscal federalism 
theory and experiences of governance institutions and financing systems both in India 
and around the world. 
 
No one system of urban governance is likely to work equally well for all urban 
local bodies. However, the paper identifies some key reforms required to realise both the 
constitutional intent to encourage citizen participation in urban governance and the 
economic and politically desirable goal of ensuring greater accountability of urban 
governments. For example, the paper draws attention to existing ambiguities in the 
assignment system and underlines the need to undertake activity mapping to ensure 
clarity as well as to make independent agencies significantly accountable to elected 
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The paper also discusses a variety of ways of augmenting the resources of the 
municipal bodies in the country including essential reforms in the property tax system and 
adequate exploitation of user charges and fees for various services delivered as well as 
ways of  strengthening and improving  Central and  State transfers to urban local 
governments. With respect to financing urban infrastructure, development charges should 
be used more  effectively. More should also be done to utilise public lands more 
effectively. In  addition, to a considerable extent capital expenditure requirements will 
have to be  financed through borrowing so further d evelopment of the municipal bond 
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Urban Governance and Finance in India 
 
 




Urbanisation and  development are inseparably linked in part because cities are 
the leading edge of economic dynamism in every country.    The concentration of 
enterprises and people from various walks of life in cities facilitates productive interaction 
and  the  exchange of ideas and  creates a climate for creative activity and enterprise 
development that leads to innovation and productivity.  Cities generate externalities that 
facilitate transactions, production, and distribution activities and serve as centres of 
entrepot trade.  Large cities in particular may achieve the critical mass required to attain 
high degrees of specialisation in labour, knowledge and businesses, services, 
infrastructure, institutions and media, all of which increase economic dynamism (Bird and 
Slack, 2007).  
  
However, t he extent to which cities  succeed in  realising their potential to 
galvanise innovation and accelerate growth depends to a considerable extent on whether 
they succeed in providing not only adequate urban public services but also good policies, 
high-quality institutions, and the tolerant and open social environment needed to facilitate 
creative social and economic interaction.  Achieving agglomeration economies in cities 
requires the  sustained provision of  a  wide range of  urban public services that underpin 
both  private sector activities and  the well-being of the urban population such as water, 
sewers, garbage collection and disposal, drainage  systems, police and fire protection, 
and  transportation.  In a world where international economic competition is linked to 
dynamic urban centres, cities that wish to attract the  ‘knowledge workers’  who are 
increasingly the drivers of growth also need policies to  accommodate diverse cultures 
(including outsiders)  as well as such ‘quality of life’ factors as h igh quality schools and 
healthcare facilities, social and cultural activities, recreational opportunities, and safe and 
strong neighbourhoods. Moreover, cities must also accommodate all those who make the 
city work, including new migrants and others who work in construction and other essential 
activities and often need affordable housing and in many cases some social assistance.  
Finally, underlying all this, a ‘good’ city also needs a political and governance system that 
responds to the requirements and needs of  its people swiftly without entailing heavy 
transaction costs. 
 
Good p olicies,  good  local governance  systems, and  sound  arrangements to 
finance public services are critical elements in sustainable urban development and shape 
the  nature and quality of public services provided as well as the structure of incentives 
and accountability.  Open multicultural policies support cosmopolitanism and attract both 
capital and labour; in contrast, restrictive policies create insecurity and prevent efficient 
migration.  Cities, to be competitive, need  both to  provide quality public services in 
adequate quantities and to be responsive to the requirements of people and businesses.  
To do so, they  not only require adequate sources of finance but also  effective 
participatory mechanisms that elicit the preferences of people and provide the services 
that meet these preferences.  The governance system should also  foster accountability 
by ensuring that, by and large, urban residents themselves pay for  the public services   6 
they receive ( except to the extent that  urban services  provide  significant external 
benefits outside the urban area itself). 
 
In India, over 330 million people live in urban areas distributed over 5,165 cities. 
Urban population has grown at an annual rate of 2.7 per cent and, even though overall 
population growth is expected to decelerate, the urban population is likely to continue to 
grow at about 2.5 per cent until 2031 (Ramanathan and Dasgupta, 2009).  In 2005, there 
were 96 municipal corporations, 1494 municipalities and 2092 Nagar Panchayats in 2005 
(India, 2004).  Over a million people lived in each of  35 cities, and of the 10  largest 
metropolises in the world, three ( Mumbai, Delhi and Kolkata) are in India.  The urban 
sector presently contributes about two-thirds of GDP and this share is likely to increase to 
75  per cent by 2021 ( India, 2008).  India’s cities are thus  already  large, economically 
important, and growing.  Ensuring that they can meet the challenges they face will not be 
easy.  
   
Demands for better infrastructure and better public services in India’s urbanised 
areas are large and growing.   In contrast, the resources now available  to urban local 
governments  are clearly inadequate, falling short even  of  the norms (adjusted for 
inflation) set long ago by the Zakaria Committee (India, 1963).  Mohanty et al (2007), for 
example, found that on average for the period 1999-2000 to 2003-04 actual spending in 
30 large municipal corporations in India was only about 24 per cent of the requirements 
established by the Zakaria Committee almost half a century earlier.  While there was 
considerable variability in the sample, the extent of  ‘under spending’ on urban services 
was over 75 per cent in 17 municipal corporations, and indeed over 50 per cent in all of 
them except for three -- Pune (31.6 per cent), Nagpur (30.8 per cent), and Nasik (35.5 
per cent).  At the other extreme,  spending in  the Patna Municipal Corporation  was 
estimated to be only 5.6 per cent of the normative requirement, and the shortfall was over 
90  per cent in almost all municipal corporations in  the poorest States of  Uttar  Pradesh 
and Bihar. 
 
  Financing urban infrastructure and services  adequately  is thus a formidable 
challenge. The infrastructure deficit in urban areas is not only large but growing. Recent 
analysis by the Planning Commission shows that 34 per cent of urban households do not 
have water taps within their premises, 26 per cent of them do not have toilets, 70 per cent 
of waste is not treated before disposal, and untreated sewerage and unregulated 
discharge from industries is a major source of  water pollution. In total, according to the 
draft Eleventh Five  Year Plan document, only 63  per cent of  the  urban population had 
access to sewerage and sanitation facilities in 2004.  Urban transportation problems are 
similarly acute. Public transportation is congested and inefficient, and  even  those who 
can afford private transportation on average travel only a kilometer in 15 minutes owing 
to road congestion. Housing too is problematic, with  almost 21  per cent of the  urban 
population liv ing in squatter settlements. 
 
Such problems are likely to worsen in the near future with continued urban 
growth. As  both,  education and skill levels of  the  population and manufacturing and 
service sectors expand, migration to urban areas will continue, resulting in a continued 
high urban population growth rate  even as  the  fertility rate in urban areas declines.  
Ramanathan and Dasgupta (2009) estimate cumulative capital investment requirements 
for providing services at 2007 prices for the period 2006-2031 at Rs. 71,251 billion and 
O&M requirements at Rs. 10,031 billion.  This works out to an annual average of Rs.   7 
3,251 billion or about 25 per cent of the consolidated revenue receipts of the Centre and 
States.   
 
  Exponentially growing urban public service  requirements  cannot be financed 
from local tax bases that are  inflexible and  have  low buoyancy. The only important tax 
handle  urban local governments have  is the property tax.  At one time,  some states 
allowed urban local bodies to levy a tax on the entry of goods into a local area for 
consumption, use or sale (octroi).  This tax was distortionary and  inefficient, but it also 
provided a buoyant source of local revenues.  Now, h owever,  all  States except 
Maharashtra have  abolished this tax, and even in the latter, the tax is levied only by 
municipal corporations and not by smaller municipalities.    Some  States, like Punjab, 
Haryana and Rajasthan, have done even more to ensure that urban local revenues are 
inadequate by abolishing the  residential property tax.  Everywhere  urban local bodies 
have proved unable (or unwilling) to  effect periodic revision  of property values, thus 
rendering the tax  non-buoyant in raising revenues.  As for other revenue sources, 
intergovernmental transfers from the States to local governments are not only inadequate, 
they are also generally ad hoc and poorly designed and targeted.  Finally, the absence of 
a debt market for local government bonds makes financing infrastructure  even more 
difficult.   
 
Turning India’s cities into ‘engines of growth’ is thus a formidable challenge.  Not 
only  must  adequate finance for the provision of services  be found  but  it is critical to 
ensure that the money spent results in desired outputs and outcomes.  To do this, local 
governance structures also need to be reformed and strengthened. The aim of this brief 
paper is to contribute to this task by analysing urban governance and finance in India in 
the  context  of  lessons  drawn  from  fiscal federalism  theory and experiences of 
governance institutions and financing systems around the world.  
 
The paper is organised as follows.  To begin with,  section 2  sets out some 
important preconditions for efficient governance systems and finance drawn from  the 
theory of fiscal federalism. Section 3 then summarises briefly four alternative models of 
governance to see what lessons international experience in governing large cities might 
suggests for improving urban governance in India. Section 4 underlines the problems that 
arise for urban areas in India  as a result of  ambiguity and overlap in the  expenditure 
assignment system. A key principle emerging from the literature surveyed in section 2 is 
the importance of ensuring  that the cost of providing public services is borne by the 
residents who benefit from them. Section 5 therefore considers taxes on residents and 
user charges a s  an  important  way to  finance local public services  while ensuring 
efficiency and accountability.  However, some urban agglomerations may simply not have 
sufficiently large tax bases to finance the required levels of services from such sources.  
In such cases, this fiscal disability may have to be offset through transfers from higher 
level governments.  Similarly,  if  benefits of public services spill  across jurisdictions, 
intergovernmental transfers may again be required. Section 6 discusses such transfers.  
Local taxes and current transfers together may at best perhaps be able to finance current 
service provision (including maintenance).  As discussed in  section 7,  however,  large 
urban capital infrastructure such as, roads or water and sewerage systems almost always 
requires alternative finance through such sources as local borrowing, development 
charges, land sales, or public-private partnerships.  Section 8 concludes. 
 
Financing public expenditures in  cities is a key issue in urban planning and 
development.  Since  every city is different,  no single approach will suit all.  The   8 
appropriate strategy for any city will differ depending upon a variety of factors such as its 
size, economic conditions, the composition of various population groups within the city, 
and  the  extent of urbanisation.  Nonetheless, this examination of Indian reality in the 
context of both theory and international experience with local governance and finance 
suggests, we think, some clear directions for possible reforms to increase the dynamism 
of India’s cities and realise more fully their potential as engines of national growth. 
 
   
 




The theory of fiscal federalism deals with efficiency, equity, and accountability in 
public service delivery.  The traditional theory  of fiscal federalism  demonstrates the 
welfare  gains from fiscal decentralisation by matching public service provision with the 
varied preferences of the people living in different jurisdictions.  In  one formulation, 
people ’vote with their feet’ by moving to localities providing public service- tax mixes that 
closely matches their preferences (Tiebout, 1956).  However,  the unrealism of the 
‘footloose mobility’ assumption as well as  information asymmetry relating to public 
services and tax mix in different localities limits the applicability of this model to real world 
situations.  An alternative formulation is the ‘decentralisation theorem’ which states that 
“… in the absence of cost savings from the centralised provision of a (local public) good 
and of inter-jurisdictional externalities, the level of welfare will always be at least as high 
(and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption a re provided in each 
jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of consumption is maintained across all 
jurisdictions” (Oates, 1972, p. 54).  The welfare gains  from decentralisation  are larger 
when variations in demand  are  greater and where the demand f or local services is 
relatively inelastic.  Although uniform provision of public services need not necessarily 
result from centralisation  per se, the ability of  a centralised system to cater to diverse 
preferences is limited by information asymmetry and political constraints (Oates, 1999).   
 
Traditional fiscal federalism theory assumes that governments are benevolent in 
the sense that their sole policy objective is to maximise social welfare.  In contrast, the 
“second generation” theory (SGT) of fiscal federalism assumes that  agents within 
governments (bureaucrats and politicians)  attempt to maximise their own welfare 
functions  within  a constellation of incentives and constraints  shaped by the 
characteristics of the prevailing fiscal and political institutions (Oates, 2008).   
 
One  SGT approach applies industrial organisation theories to  fiscal federalism 
and analyses multilevel fiscal arrangements in terms of the principal-agent framework 
(Seabright, 1996).  A second approach, motivated partly by the fiscal crisis precipitated in 
several Latin American countries as exploitation of “fiscal commons” resulted in perverse 
behaviour by subnational governments, applies the ‘soft budget constraint’ developed by 
Kornai (1986) in the context of State enterprises in socialist economies (Rodden et. al., 
2003).  A third SGT approach employs more formal political economy approaches based, 
for example, on legislative structure and electoral process to analyse different kinds of 
fiscal outcomes under centralised and decentralised politics.  A s an example,  the 
outcomes emerging from so-called “yardstick competition” are analysed under the rubric 
of “competitive federalism” by  Breton  (1996). T hese approaches  are not intended to   9 
replace the traditional theory of fiscal federalism; rather, they are to be considered as 
complements to and extensions of that theory. 
  
In principle,  theories of fiscal federalism  cover all multilevel fiscal systems, 
irrespective of whether a country is formally federal or unitary, the number of layers in the 
system, the sizes and capacities of jurisdictions and whether the local governments are in 
rural or in urban areas.   In practice, however, many of the ‘lessons’ such theories 
suggest are not easy to apply in a real-world context such as India. For example, since 
the benefit span of each public service (policing, water supply, street lighting) is different, 
it is seldom possible to have a different local government that coincides with the benefit 
span  of each public service.  Aggregating  diverse  public services under particular local 
governments is likely to result both in scale diseconomies and  spillovers and efficiency 
concerns.  Similarly, it is seldom  appropriate to consider the challenges faced by  all 
subnational governments to be identical when the nature of public services provided, the 
technology for providing the services,  the nature and quality of institutions and their 
capacities, the bargaining strength needed to resolve spillovers, and the instruments and 
the  capacity to finance the public services  may all differ  vastly in different cases. 
Nonetheless, a few general lessons emerge from the literature.    
 
For instance, an important precondition for efficient provision of public services is 
clarity in the assignment  of functions (expenditure responsibilities) to each level of 
government. Who does what should depend upon the benefit span of the public service 
in question, the extent of diversity in demand for the service, the technology available for 
its efficient provision and the capacity o f the jurisdiction to provide the service. An 
important reason for assigning functions clearly not just to jurisdictions but to particular 
functionaries within each jurisdiction is to ensure responsiveness and accountability.  In a 
democratic polity the elected executive should have the overall decision making powers 
for public service provision and the role of the bureaucracy is to implement the decisions 
taken by the executive.  Finally, even when the basic assignment system is clear, since 
some overlapping is almost inevitable, it is also important to establish clear systems and 
institutions within which to resolve such issues.   
 
Once  functions  have been  assigned according to comparative advantage, 
financial powers should follow. In assigning local revenue sources, however, it is 
important to strengthen rather than weaken local accountability. Accountability of 
governments to local residents can best be achieved when the residents of the 
jurisdiction bear the cost of providing the services at least at the margin. Hence, local 
governments must have powers to raise revenues so that they can increase expenditures 
on public services as desired by the residents.  Ensuring that there is what Breton (1996) 
calls a strong  ’Wicksellian’ linkage between revenue and  expenditure decisions at the 
margin is critical to ensure that urban governments both take rational decisions and are 
accountable for their decisions.   
 
Local governments generally provide a mix of ‘private’ and  ’public’ goods. In 
principle, user charges paid by those who benefit directly should cover the cost of  the 
private goods provided.  Similarly, the cost of public services benefiting the jurisdiction as 
a whole  should be collected  from taxes on the residents.  On the other hand, services 
whose benefits spill over the jurisdiction  should be partly paid for  by  taxing  residents 
(equivalent to the benefits received by them) and partly through transfers, as discussed 
below.  Local  governments  may obviously  levy taxes on immobile bases such as real 
property. In addition, however, the benefit principle suggests that they may also to a   10 
limited extent be permitted to impose taxes on mobile bases, although such powers must 
be bestowed with care to avoid encouraging shifting the cost of local services to non-
residents (Bird and Smart, 2009). 
 
Intergovernmental transfers play an important role in  fiscal federalism.  In the 
traditional approach, since  higher level governments have  a  comparative advantage in 
carrying out redistributive and stabilisation functions, they should levy all broad-based 
redistributive taxes.  On the other hand, for efficiency reasons considerable expenditure 
responsibility  is properly assigned to lower level governments.   The resulting vertical 
imbalance between expenditures and revenues at  each level is generally  corrected 
through transfers from the higher to lower levels.  Within each level of subnational 
government, some jurisdictions will inevitably suffer some fiscal disability owing to factors 
such as below average  revenue capacity and  higher unit costs of providing public 
services.  Differences in these factors  create different net fiscal benefits in different 
jurisdictions and may thus induce inefficient factor movements (Buchanan, 1950).  This 
problem may be exacerbated when subnational governments impose origin-based taxes 
(Boadway and Flatters, 1982).    The solution to such inefficiencies is  again  usually 
considered to lie in appropriate intergovernmental fiscal transfers.  All such ‘balance-
restoring’ transfers intended to enable every jurisdiction to provide comparable levels of 
services at comparable tax rates should be  unconditional (Bird and Smart, 2002).  In 
addition, however, there is also often  a case for providing specific purpose transfers to 
ensure minimum standards of public services with significant inter-jurisdictional 
externalities.   In this case, the appropriate transfer design is rather different, as 
discussed further in section 6 below.   
 
In practice, it is invariably difficult to resolve the various issues that arise in 
designing a system of transfers.  There is, for example, no completely objective way to 
measure the degree of vertical or horizontal imbalance.  Similarly, with respect to specific 
purpose transfers, as a rule it is impossible to measure the degree of externalities and 
hence to develop optimal cost sharing arrangements or matching ratios.  As mentioned 
above, to some extent  the  economic argument for decentralisation is based on 
asymmetric information in terms of the inability of the central government to estimate the 
correct degree of spillovers, so it is somewhat ironic that the proper  design of  specific 
purpose transfers requires exactly such information.  As a U.S. study showed (Inman, 
2003) in actual practice matching ratios never correspond to the extent of spillovers and 
the federal share is invariably much higher than the spillovers involved.  Finally, even if all 
the conceptual and empirical problems inherent in designing an economically optimal 
transfer system could be overcome, invariably non-economic  (including political) 
objectives creep in and ensure that the actual transfer system differs from the ideal. 
   
  Moreover, some have even questioned whether intergovernmental transfers are 
a good idea in any case. Transfers inevitably soften the budget constraint and have been 
argued to undermine fiscal discipline and p romote fiscal irresponsibility and 
macroeconomic instability (Prud’homme, 1995).  Equalising transfers given to offset fiscal 
disadvantages can interfere with the normal process of income convergence  which 
occurs in the process of economic growth due to the migration of labour and capital from 
places with lower productivity to those with higher productivity. Specific purpose transfers 
may also  not effectively encourage local expenditures on the desired function owing to 
the fungibility of funds.   For these and other reasons, some have cast serious doubts on 
the efficacy of intergovernmental transfers in serving the long-term interests of a 
federation.     11 
Nonetheless, in  reality substantial transfers are  found in  every federal country 
between Centre and States and in almost every country between  Central and State (or 
just  State) governments and local governments.  The reason is essentially simply 
because  perfectly matching revenue powers  with expenditure responsibilities is not 
possible.  What does the fiscal federalism literature tell us about how the inevitable 
transfer system should be designed and implemented? First, if the basic economic case 
for decentralisation is accepted at all, then the role of transfers should neither be so large 
as to turn local governments into simple agents of higher level governments or to make 
them ‘transfer dependent’ and hence fiscally irresponsible, nor so small as to render them 
incapable of providing minimal local services to their residents. Second, one key way to 
strike this ‘hard budget constraint’ balance is to ensure that richer local governments are 
as ‘self-financing’ as possible and that even the poorest local governments have 
sufficient revenue flexibility so that revenue and expenditure decisions are matched at the 
margin  in the sense that any local decision to expand expenditure must be financed 
through additional local taxation (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998).  Third, Central and State 
governments must be careful not to ‘bail out’ bad local decisions by expanding transfers, 
which means, in effect, that the system of grants must be transparent, predictable, and 
essentially ‘infra-marginal’ for any particular budgetary period so that local governments 
do not have incentives to free-ride.   
 
For urban dynamism to be fully realised, the national economic space needs to 
be  unified in a  common  market.  Market impediments can  arise by restricting  the 
movement of labour, capital and commodities as well as through such institutional factors 
as linguistic barriers and the lack of  a secure environment.  In addition, the literature on 
‘market-preserving federalism’ shows that to ensure an efficient nation-wide market, local 
governments must face a hard budget constraint (Weingast, 1995, 2009). A hard budget 
constraint is critical to make subnational governments adopt rational and efficient 
decisions. To reach this point, however, not only must expenditure functions and revenue 
sources, including transfers, be assigned, designed and implemented properly, but efforts 
must also be undertaken to strengthen and deepen markets, particularly land and capital 
markets.   Removal of impediments to mobility and trade in factors and products, 
including the abolition of laws restricting markets as well as removal of institutional 
rigidities, is an essential ingredient of national and international market success. Efficient 
credit and debt markets and a well developed banking system along with credible credit 
rating institutions are important preconditions to avoid bailouts.  Similarly, well developed 
land and property markets and free mobility of factors and products may prevent public 
sector decisions that impede the development of markets and competition and 
discourage protectionist policies at subnational levels.   Intergovernmental competition 
can sometimes be beneficial.  It may lead to gains in terms of efficient service delivery as 
well as innovation and productivity gains.  To reap such gains, however, it is important to 
ensure that there is a measure of competitive equality and proper checks against 
predatory competition as well as against restrictive and protectionist policies. All these 
issues become particularly important in the context of globalisation  because  localities 
with better linkage with markets and infrastructure can reap higher benefits from access 
to domestic and international markets and grow faster than those with less access to 
markets and infrastructure.  Finally, in case something goes badly wrong in some locality, 
it is also essential to develop institutions that can  handle local ‘fiscal crises’ and even 
bankruptcy.   
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III. Models of Urban Governance and Governance Systems in India 
 
(i)  Models of Governance: 
 
  As the theories of fiscal federalism reviewed in the previous section demonstrate, 
to be economically dynamic, cities need the right  governmental structure.  The 
decentralisation theorem, like the ‘subsidiarity principle’ included in the European Union 
Treaty of 1992, suggests that efficiency and accountability in public service provision 
requires decision making by the level of government closest to the citizens.  At the same 
time, economies of scale  and minimising coordination costs in providing such services 
often  require a larger governmental  jurisdiction, as does efficient raising of revenue.  
Resolving these conflicting considerations requires the choice of appropriate governance 
structure which is discussed in this section. 
 
  Good governance systems elicit  preferences for public services, ensure 
responsiveness in  the provision of such services, provide accessibility to citizens and 
achieve cost savings by adopting  an  appropriate scale of operation.  Thus, an efficient 
governance system depends on a variety of actors.  In smaller municipalities, all 
regulatory, planning,  revenue raising, and spending decisions will be done by the 
municipality and the governance system, is simple.  However, in larger municipal 
corporations it is necessary to set up systems to ensure accessibility, responsiveness 
and coordination.  In metropolitan regions, governance systems are even more important.   
Bird and Slack (2007) discuss four alternative models of metropolitan governance: (i) 
one-tier model; (ii) two-tier model; (iii)  voluntary co-operation, and (iv) special purpose 
districts.
1   
 
  In the  one-tier model, which is common in the United States, a  single  level of 
local government is responsible for providing all local services.  Most American cities 
organised in this way are highly fragmented.  For example, the Chicago Metropolitan 
Area has 464 local governments (counties, municipalities, townships) and in Houston, 
Texas, the central city is surrounded by 790 governments and overlapping special 
districts.  One-tier models are also found in other countries, such as Caracas (Venezuela) 
and Bogota (Colombia) and Shanghai (China), although in most cases such cities are 
‘consolidated’ one-tier structures.  In Shanghai, for instance, although there is essentially 
a one-tier government, within that tier there are three levels of management – municipal, 
district, and sub-district. In India, Mumbai has been characterised as a “fragmented one-
tier structure” (Slack, 2007, p. 15).  Mumbai itself has 7 wards, each with its own 
municipal officials, and the surrounding eastern and western suburbs are also divided 
into wards.  Within the Mumbai urban agglomeration,  however, in addition to the 
municipal corporations of Mumbai, Kalyan, and New Mumbai,  there is the Mumbai 
Regional Development Authority, 16 municipal towns, 7 non-municipal urban areas, and 
995 villages.  Moreover, management of urban services in Mumbai is divided among the 
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, the State of Maharashtra, and the Government 
of India.  For example, the urban rail network is run by Indian Railways.   
 
A one-tier consolidated government may be created by amalgamation of two or 
more lower tier municipalities or by annexation of areas under adjacent local bodies.  All 
taxing and spending decisions are made at one level.  The services delivered in  a one-
                                                 
1 An expanded version of this paper, together with a number of related papers on metropolitan 
governance, may be found in Rojas et. al. (2008).   13 
tier structure  need not necessarily be uniform: for example, if there are d ifferences in 
service levels before amalgamation, they may persist.  In the long term, however, there 
will be pressure towards having uniform services.    One  rationale  for having  a 
consolidated one-tier metropolitan body is that its larger taxable capacity gives it more 
ability to borrow and levy user charges to cover capital and operating costs of providing 
services.  It is also  often  argued that a malgamation into  a  one-tier  municipal structure 
helps to  internalise externalities, enables greater  economies of scale, helps to  achieve 
better service coordination, ensures clearer accountability, streamlines decision making 
and  enables  greater efficiency in service provision  (Bahl and Linn, 1992).  These 
arguments played a large role in the adoption of the one-tier model in Toronto (Canada) 
in 1998. However, experience  in Toronto and elsewhere  shows that amalgamations do 
not necessarily result in cost savings.  There may be some cost savings as duplication in 
activities is eliminated, but the  pressure to  equalise  salaries and benefits as well as to 
raise service levels up to the highest levels prevailing in the new larger municipality may 
often  outweigh any cost savings (Bird a nd Slack, 2007). An additional advantage of a 
one-tier governance structure is that it may make it easier to achieve redistributional 
goals within the metropolitan area.  This consideration  understandably played a major 
role in South Africa’s decision to introduce one-tier metropolitan governments to replace 
the former racially-segregated municipalities. However, the one-tier model carries with it 
the disadvantage of making local government more remote from citizens, thus reducing 
accessibility.  Moreover,  amalgamating municipalities may reduce competition and 
reduce efficiency.   
 
  In the two-tier model, the lower tier is responsible for providing services having 
smaller geographical  spread  while the  upper tier  encompassing a larger geographical 
area provides services with corresponding geographical spread as well as those involving 
significant economies of scale.  This model has some characteristics that make it suitable 
for large metropolitan regions.  Examples may be found, for instance, in Madrid (Spain), 
Santiago (Chile), and Manila (Philippines), and the two-tier model was adopted in London 
(U.K.) in 2002.  Two-tier structures already exist in  many Indian cities.  For example, 
Hyderabad Municipal Corporation has 11 municipalities, Chennai Municipal Corporation 
has 36 municipalities, and Kolkata has 41 municipalities within its area (Bandyopadhyay 
and Rao, 2009).   In principle, the two-tier model may have potential advantages over the 
one-tier model owing to its greater responsiveness, efficiency and accountability.  Some 
redistribution is also possible in this structure through a combination of tax and spending 
decisions.  On the other hand, there may also be overlap and duplication in the provision 
of services.  Moreover, since the structure is less transparent residents may be confused 
as to who is actually responsible for which services. 
 
  The third  approach to governing metropolitan regions  is the  voluntary 
cooperation model, which essentially consists of an  area-wide body based on voluntary 
cooperation among different municipalities with no permanent institutional structure. 
Examples of such arrangements may be found in Bologna (Italy), Marseilles (France), 
Vancouver (Canada), and Sao Paulo (Brazil).  A variant of this approach focused on 
solid-waste and waste-water infrastructure development exists in Yogyakarta (Indonesia). 
Such systems usually develop incrementally as a way to provide services across regions 
efficiently without  requiring formal  amalgamation.  Individual municipalities retain their 
identities and remain accessible to residents while at the same time becoming a part of 
the regional group to achieve economies of scale and scope and coordinate public 
service delivery.  Voluntary cooperation can take the form of inter-municipal agreements 
– formal or informal -- for the provision of specified services, generally with the objective   14 
of reducing the costs of providing the service.  This approach may be useful for individual 
services (e.g. regional transit).  However, as a general model of metropolitan governance, 
voluntary co-operation models may not work well or be sustainable over time  because 
the objective functions of the policymakers in different metropolitan regions likely differ.  
Further, there may be problems of clarity in public accountability, and if things do not go 
well, inter-municipal conflicts and litigation may erupt.  
 
  The fourth governance model for public service delivery  in large metropolitan 
areas is the setting up of specialised agencies.  Specialised agencies can provide similar 
municipal services to several municipalities  while  minimising unit costs and ensuring 
efficiency in service provision.  In the United States, where such specialised agencies are 
particularly important, one third of all local governments are school districts (Bird and 
Slack, 2007).  In India, specialised agencies  for providing water supply, waste 
management, and transportation across a number of municipalities already exist.   This 
approach has a number of clear advantages.  For example, specialised agencies can 
reap economies of scale and address the issue of spillovers, can be professionally 
managed to ensure efficiency and can to at least some extent establish and collect user 
charges without political considerations.  On the  other hand, there are also 
disadvantages to this approach.  There may, for instance, be problems of coordination 
when a number of specialised agencies providing different services are involved.  In 
addition, these agencies may have no local political accountability unless their decisions 
are subject to the approval by the municipal executive.   Furthermore, if municipal taxes 
go to support such agencies but there  is no  clear linkage  between  the expenditure 
decisions of the specialised agencies and the taxes collected by the municipalities; the 
absence  of  the ‘ Wicksellian connection’ between revenues and expenditures further 
reduces accountability.  While specialised agencies can  certainly improve  efficiency in 
the delivery of some services, if they are not locally accountable it is far from clear that 
they are supplying the right services in the right places.  
   
          In the  end, no unique model of governance can  fit all municipalities or even the 
same municipality at different times.  As Slack (2007) notes, for example, in recent years 
a number of major cities have changed their governance model.  Toronto moved from a 
fragmented one-tier structure to a two-tier structure and then, most recently a 
consolidated single-tier structure.  On the other hand, London moved from a two-tier 
structure to a one-tier structure and then, most recently, back to a two-tier structure. 
Cape Town (South Africa) moved within a very few years from having no metro 
government at all to first a two-tier and then a consolidated one-tier metropolitan structure 
while over more or less the same period Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) moved from one-tier to 
two-tier to one-tier. What is ’right’ for any city is seldom clear, and may change over time. 
In  larger metropolitan areas, however, the real choice boils down  to one-tier or two-tier 
governance structures  perhaps supplemented by some  voluntary  inter-municipal  co-
operative agreements or specialised agencies to provide particular public services. The 
most critical point is that there must be some kind of  unified system to address region-
wide problems and to provide and coordinate public service provision such as 
transportation, economic competition, social cohesion, and environmental coordination.  
In addition, to foster and ensure citizen involvement and government responsiveness to 
local residents, a lower level of local government is often also desirable. Voluntary inter-
municipal agreements may  sometimes  be necessary in some areas to internalise 
externalities.  Similarly, sometimes it may be desirable to create   specialised agencies to 
provide  certain regional services although it is important that such agencies should be 
significantly accountable to local residents.      15 
(ii)   Municipal Governments in India: 
 
The issue of governance in large metropolitan cities must be distinguished from 
the case of smaller municipalities.  In large metropolitan cities, the concentration of a 
variety of economic activities, the cosmopolitan composition of population, and large 
migration requires a system of public service provision that not only facilitates economic 
activities but also promotes the  social interaction and cohesion  necessary to facilitate 
innovation and impart dynamism.  However, especially when large metropolitan cities are 
also  State capitals, how they are actually governed may deviate substantially from this 
mandate in response to the compulsions of local politics.  Restrictive protectionist policies 
responding to pressures to provide employment to local population, preferences for local 
population in business dealings and contracts,  and  preferences based on linguistic, 
ethnic, and other considerations  may  rob cities of their metropolitan character.  A 
possible way to free  large cities from such  State political pressures may be  to  remove 
them from the control of the State governments and create new separate city-states – for 
example, for cities with a population of more than ten million. Germany, for example, has 
three such city-states, including Berlin.  Brussels is also a separate city-state in Belgium.  
Berlin and Brussels are of course also national capitals, and many other countries – the 
United States, Australia, Mexico, and Brazil, for example, have created special capital 
districts, as of course has India.
2  In addition to Beijing, China has three metropolitan 
provinces – Shanghai, Tianjin and, most recently, Chongqing. As Indian experience with 
the special case of New Delhi shows, however, being special and separate is only at 
most a partial answer to the financial and governance problems facing large, rapidly 
growing cities in India (Mathur, 2009), so we do not pursue this possibility further in the 
present paper.   
 
Until the 74
th Constitutional Amendment, the structure of urban governance in 
India essentially evolved from the compulsions of urbanisation.  In principle, the primary 
responsibilities are vested in the executive Mayor chosen by the elected representatives, 
and local officials are charged with implementing the decisions taken by the executive.  In 
practice, however, the role of the Mayor (or Chairperson) of the municipality who is the 
executive head is often confused with that of the Municipal Commissioner  — an official 
who is supposed to implement the policies approved by the Executive.  In addition, 
governance in  smaller municipalities often suffers from inadequate administrative 
capacity to plan, effectively regulate, raise revenues and implement spending decisions.   
Moreover, both State and Central politicians, in varying degrees in different regions, often 
interfere in the functioning of municipalities. 
    
Effective fiscal decentralisation requires that not only must appropriate functions 
and adequate finances be devolved to the local governments, but also control over those 
they employ.  In fact, however, municipal governments do not have the power to appoint 
their chief official  – the Municipal Commissioner, who is instead a  State government 
official deputed by the  State government.  Since the local government has no role 
whatsoever in the appointment, promotion, or transfer of the Municipal Commissioner, it 
is hardly surprising that he is in reality primarily accountable to the  State government 
rather than to elected local representatives. Recently, the Expert Committee on the 
Governance in Bangalore Metropolitan Region recommended that the Commissioner of 
Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BBMP)  -- the Greater Bangalore Municipal 
                                                 
2 For a recent detailed study of finance and governance in capital cities in a number of federal 
States, including India, see Slack and Chattopadhyay (2009).   16 
Corporation -- should be selected by a high-powered search committee constituted by the 
State in consultation with the Mayor and, more importantly, that the Commissioner’s role 
should be redefined in the legislation to make him/her clearly responsible and 
accountable to the Mayor and the corporation.  If India’s larger cities are to have effective 
urban governance structures, similar steps need to be taken by all State governments to 
make the Commissioners in municipal corporations and municipalities primarily 
responsible and accountable to the respective municipal bodies. Of course, so long as 
the Commissioner’s career path remains essentially in the  State bureaucracy, some 
problem of  ‘dual subordination’ still remains, but at a minimum it is critical that the chief 
municipal officer should clearly be primarily accountable to the municipality he or she 
serves rather than to the State, as is now the case.    
 
The  constitution places “Local government, that is to say, the constitution and 
powers of municipal corporations, improvement trusts, district boards, mining settlement 
authorities and other local authorities for the purpose of local self-government or village 
administration” as item 5 of the  State list in  its Seventh  Schedule. Urban governance 
structures are thus determined by the  States. Although the  74
th Amendment accorded 
constitutional recognition to the municipal bodies,  by and large local governance 
structures  have carried over  from the past.  To strengthen participatory planning, t he 
constitutional  amendment provided for  the setting up of Metropolitan Planning 
Committees (Article 243ZE) to prepare the draft development plan in every metropolitan 
area.  Similarly, District Planning Committees (DPC)  were established by Article 243ZD 
to consolidate and co-ordinate planning coordinated by district panchayats for rural areas 
and municipalities for the urban areas.  The constitutional amendment also mandated the 
holding of  ward  sabhas (assembly)  to elicit the preferences of the people for public 
services and to  develop planning from the grassroots level.  However, none  of these 
requirements were really observed in practice until the Planning Commission mandated 
the setting up of the DPCs based on the recommendations of the Committee on 
Grassroots Planning (India, 2005).  Despite this mandate, the exercise in  grassroots 
planning continues to be in its infancy.  In most States, urban local bodies do not as yet 
have regular  ward  sabhas.  Even in  States that do  have them, they are not used as a 
mechanism for urban planning or eliciting the preferences for public services.   Similarly, 
many States are yet to legislate for let alone to create Metropolitan Planning Committees. 
 
Under  Article 243S,  State governments  are required to constitute Ward 
Committees comprising one or more wards within the territorial jurisdiction of a 
municipality having a population of more than 300,000.   In addition to the  members 
representing each  ward, the composition of the Ward Committee and the manner of 
selection of the members is required to be specified in the relevant State Municipal Acts. 
The objective of having Ward Committees is to provide a mechanism to elicit  and 
respond to  the preferences as well as complaints of the people of different wards with 
respect to public services and again, to establish a mechanism for grassroots planning.  
In reality, however, this provision  has as yet hardly been implemented anywhere, and 
where such  committees have been  established they  almost never  undertake their 
required functions.  
  
  The issue of governance in  India’s  major metropolitan  areas  is extremely 
important not only for the millions who live there but also for the economic development 
of the country as a whole.  Big cities need not only a sound governance structure but one 
that works well.  To attain this, steps  should  be taken to  implement the ‘preference-
revelation’ and citizen access structures set out in the  constitution. M ore immediately   17 
critical, steps should also be taken to set out clearly the roles that different political and 
bureaucratic actors are supposed to play at the municipal level and then to let them do 
their jobs unencumbered by interference by politicians at higher levels of government and 
with primary accountability to those whom they are supposed to serve – local residents.    
 
 
  IV.  What Do Urban Local Governments Do? 
 
 
(i)   Expenditure Assignment 
 
  The traditional theory of fiscal federalism argues that the essential function of 
local governments is allocative. The p otential mobility of economic agents reduces the 
effectiveness of local governments in carrying out redistribution. Similarly, the openness 
of local economies means that they can do little in terms of stabilisation (Oates, 1972).    
The main task of the local governments is thus to provide local goods and services within 
the area under their jurisdictions.
3  Some of these services may be essentially private 
goods if, for example, markets fail for reasons such as information asymmetry or if public 
policy purposes require such provision.  Except when overridden by distributive 
considerations, efficiency requires that local governments should levy user charges to 
those who benefit from  the  private goods  -- such as  water supply, sewerage, 
transportation and recreation services  -- that they p rovide.  On the other hand, l ocal 
public services benefiting the local population  in general should be financed by taxing 
residents, while services whose benefits spill over jurisdictional boundaries usually need 
to be financed in part by intergovernmental transfers. Finally, in principle the best way to 
finance large capital investments that will continue to provide services long into the future 
is through borrowing.  Of course,  it is important to ensure  that  neither  transfers  nor 
borrowing turn into bailouts that  soften the  budget constraint facing local government 
decision-makers.  
 
  The 74
th  Constitutional  Amendment,  Article 243W,  allows  the legislature of a 
State  to devolve  such powers and functions to  its municipalities as needed  to enable 
them as self-government institutions as well as for the “preparation of plans of economic 
development and social justice” and the performance of functions and implementation of 
schemes as may be entrusted to them including the 18 functions to be devolved to the 
municipal bodies listed in the Twelfth Schedule to the constitution.     
 
   Some important observations relating to the present functional domain assigned 
to  municipal bodies must be noted.  First, the listed items are identical for all types of 
municipal bodies  – the municipal corporations, municipalities and  nagar  panchayats.   
Second, since the extent of devolution of functions to the municipal bodies is left to the 
discretion of the State governments the extent of devolution may vary significantly across 
municipal bodies in different  States.  In general,  State governments  are reluctant  to 
devolve functions to the local governments on the  grounds that they do not have the 
capacity to undertake them.  Third, since the 18 listed ‘municipal’ items are all also either 
in the State list or in the concurrent list of the Seventh Schedule of the constitution, there 
                                                 
3 This does not mean that local governments do not have any role in redistributive or stabilisation 
functions.  Local governments sometimes have local employment programmes (Inman and 
Rubinfeld, 1997) and may also play a role in implementing anti-poverty interventions (Rao and Das-
Gupta, 1995; Rao, 2002).   18 
is considerable concurrency and overlap not only between the  State government and 
municipal bodies but also between the central government and the municipal bodies.  It is 
therefore difficult to  assign  responsibility for the provision of specific services to  a 
specified level of government, let alone to ensure that those who make the decisions are 
adequately accountable for their actions.  This problem is particularly acute in the capital 
cities of the States where the overlap in functions between the State government and the 
municipal corporation makes the system opaque.  In  Delhi, the  overlapping problem is 
even more acute as all the three levels of government – Centre, the union territory of 
Delhi and three municipal bodies – the Delhi Municipal Corporation, New Delhi Municipal 
Committee and Delhi  Cantonment  divide the powers among t hem in confusing ways 
(Mathur 2009). 
    
   There is nothing wrong with concurrent assignment of powers if there is clear 
demarcation of functional domains.  Clarity in assigning property rights is essential to the 
proper functioning  of private markets, and clarity of expenditure assignment is equally 
essential  in ensuring  efficiency and accountability in the provision of public services.  
However, to achieve clarity in functional domains given concurrent assignment requires 
careful “ activity mapping” of functions to municipal, State and  Central governments.  In 
the case of rural local governments, the Ministry of Panchayati Raj has helped to 
undertake activity mapping for district, block and village level panchayats in many States.  
Although this effort to d ate is neither complete nor  perfect, it has helped to achieve a 
measure of clarity in the functional domains.  However, no  States have yet taken  the 
initiative to undertake the activity mapping for municipal governments that is necessary to 
know precisely who is responsible for doing exactly what with sufficient clarity to achieve 
efficiency and accountability in the provision of urban local services.  Moreover, since 
both the nature of functions and the capacity to undertake them generally differ with the 
population size of the municipalities, separate activity mapping exercises are needed for 
municipal corporations, municipalities and town panchayats.    
 
As mentioned above, the Twelfth Schedule lists 18 functional areas for the urban 
local governments, leaving it to the  State governments to specify the domains of the 
urban local governments in these areas.  What most State governments have done is to 
formalise the functions that were being carried o ut by the municipal bodies even before 
the constitutional amendment.  Municipalities across the country have been vested with a 
long list of functions by the  State governments under their respective municipal 
legislations relating to public health, welfare, safety, regulation and developmental 
activities.  Functions relating to public health include water supply, sewers, sanitation, 
and waste disposal/management.  Welfare activities include social justice, safeguarding 
the interests of weaker sections, creation and running of night shelters, street lighting, 
parks, education, burial grounds and cremation facilities, playgrounds and recreation.  
Regulatory functions include prescribing and enforcing city plans, landuse and building 
by-laws, licensing of shops and establishments, removal of encroachments on public land, 
registration of births and deaths, enforcing parking regulations and Public safety includes 
fire protection and street lighting.  Public works includes construction and maintenance of 
inner city roads and buildings.  Development functions include town  planning and 
development of markets.   
 
  In addition to all these core functions, the 74
th  Constitutional  Amendment 
specifically  assigned a number of  additional  development functions to municipal 
governments in the Twelfth Schedule including planning for development, urban poverty 
alleviation, protection of environment and slum improvement and upgrading.  In most   19 
States, the various functions have been divided into obligatory and discretionary 
functions although the  division between the two categories is not uniform.  In principle, 
although municipal governments may have a comparative advantage in implementing 
many aspects of the functions listed in the Twelfth Schedule, there are also many other 
functions that might be implemented by them equally well but that are not included in the 
schedule.  In this sense, it might perhaps be said that the assignment system does not 
follow the principle of subsidiarity.  However,  there is nothing to prevent  States from 
assigning additional (unlisted) functions to municipal bodies if they are found to have a  
comparative advantage in undertaking them.   
 
  Although the functions listed in the Twelfth Schedule do not make any distinction 
between  municipal  corporations, municipalities and  nagar  panchayats, the scope and 
capacity to undertake various functions is in fact likely to vary with, inter alia, the size and 
character of the municipal body.  The assignments actually made by State governments 
are supposed to take such factors into account.  For example, in many States the large 
municipal corporations have been assigned significant powers with respect to education 
and healthcare, the regulation of industries, and the provision of intra-city and inter-city 
transportation services.  Interestingly, provision of transportation services is not one of 
the functions listed in the Twelfth Schedule.   Nor is electricity distribution, although some 
municipal corporations undertake this task through such departmental enterprises as the 
Bombay Electricity Supply and Transport (BEST) in Mumbai.    
 
  Another complication with respect to  expenditure  assignments to municipal 
governments is the emergence in some areas of independent service providers to 
provide some public services, bypassing the elected municipal governments.  This is 
precisely a result of disenchantment with poor public service delivery by municipal bodies.  
Independent service providers are also often thought to insulate policy making from 
political vagaries and hence  to  enable the professionalisation of policy and 
implementation in regard to public service delivery.  In some cases, such providers 
deliver services beyond boundaries of one municipality, adopting improved technology to 
reap economies of scale in service provision.  The most important example is the 
creation of separate water supply and sewerage bodies in the States to provide services 
across several municipalities. The main problem that may arise with this type of 
organisational set up is the agency’s relative remoteness from the people it serves and its 
lack of political accountability.  In drawing up agreements with such service providers, 
careful attention must be paid to balancing the desire for professional competence and 
least-cost provision against the need for local governments to be fully accountable to 
their residents for the provision of the public services for which they pay. 
 
(ii)  Public Financial Management 
 
  Even if activity mapping leads to the establishment of clear lines of responsibility 
and accountability, clarity of assignment in terms of specifying exactly what services each 
government is responsible for delivering is only part of the story.  Clarity must be 
matched both by  accountability in terms of democratic accountability to the local 
population a nd by  authority in terms of the ability to  manage expenditures and to 
determine (within limits) revenues.  Both financial honesty and political accountability 
require that municipal budgeting, financial reporting, and auditing should be not only 
comprehensive, comprehensible, comparable, verifiable, but also transparently public. In 
Brazil, for example, and increasingly in other countries, more and more local budgets and 
financial accounts are freely accessible on the internet, and in some instances residents   20 
are actively encouraged to participate to some extent in developing the expenditure plans 
for their areas.  
 
  Whether one goes this far or not, proper public expenditure management at any 
level of government must (a) adequately control the total level of revenue and 
expenditure; (b) appropriately allocate public resources among sectors and programmes; 
and (c) ensure that governmental institutions operate as efficiently as possible. To do this, 
urban local governments need adequate authority to manage both the expenditure and 
revenue sides of their budgets, sufficient administrative capacity to be able to do so, and 
an appropriate incentive structure to encourage them to do so.  Most Indian cities are 
handicapped in all these areas.  As discussed below, properly structuring local taxes and 
intergovernmental transfers as well as fostering a sound local borrowing market will go a 
long way towards establishing the hard budget constraint needed to ensure that local 
decision-makers respond to the right incentives and tend to allocate the funds available 
to them efficiently and effectively.  In addition, however, both central and  State 
governments need to provide a more adequate fiscal, financial, and institutional 
framework  for urban local government to  bring to reality the intentions of the 74
th 
Constitutional Amendment.  They also need to ensure that local officials are adequately 
trained and motivated to do their jobs properly.  A strong central hand may often be 
needed to ensure that good rules are in place, and are complied with.  For example, 
Central and State governments might establish a model ‘framework’ local budget law and 
financial reporting system  and require adequate external audit.  Improving the local 
budgeting and financial system along these lines will satisfy two essential requirements of 
good government.  First, it will establish the basis for financial control. Second, it will 
provide reasonably accurate, uniform, and timely financial information.   
 
    Improving local finance information is not a small matter. Improved accountability 
may be the key to improved public sector performance, but improved information is the 
key to accountability.  The systematic collection, analysis, and reporting of information 
that can be used to verify compliance with goals and to assist future decisions is critical 
to successful urban development. Such information is essential both to informed local 
participation through the political process and to the monitoring of local activity by the 
central agencies responsible for supervising and (sometimes) financing  such activity.  
Unless local ‘publics’ are aware of what is done, how well it is done, how much it costs, 
and who paid for it,  no local constituency for effective government can be created.  
Similarly, unless central agencies can monitor and evaluate local performance, there can 
be no assurance that functions of national importance will be adequately performed once 
they have been decentralised.  An important underpinning and accompaniment of any 
successful programme to strengthen urban local bodies must therefore be, perhaps 
paradoxically, an improvement in national evaluation capacity.  Decentralisation and 
improved central evaluation and assessment of local activities are not substitutes; they 
are complements.  
  
    One essential element of the hard budget constraint needed to induce efficient 
decisions by local governments is adequate Central (and State) capacity in the shape of 
credible information-gathering and evaluation.  Such ‘carrots’ of central financial support 
of local efforts as the JnNURM programme discussed below need, at least implicitly, to 
be accompanied by the possible ‘stick’ of reduced support if performance is inadequate, 
and in order to wave a credible stick, one needs some standard of adequacy and some 
way of knowing how performance measures up.  Decentralising a function to local 
governments thus does not imply that the Central and State governments no longer have   21 
any responsibility.  Rather, it means that the nature of central responsibility has changed 
to regulating and monitoring the efficiency and equity of services delivered by local 
governments.  The essential tool needed for this task is an adequate and up-to-date 
information base -- generated, for example, by requiring local governments to file uniform 
and informative budgets and financial and other reports. Unfortunately, this need for 
extended and reliable information  on local public finances and service delivery to date 
has been sadly neglected in India. 
  
    Two final points might be mentioned related to the issues just discussed.  First, 
while some financial oversight of local finances by State and even  Central officials is 
clearly necessary – not least because to a considerable extent local governments are 
spending State and Central funds – devising and implementing a system of oversight that 
balances prudence with leaving the main decision-making powers at the local level is not 
a simple task.  Both conceptually and empirically, even in countries with excellent data, it 
has proven difficult to develop ways of measuring local f inancial performance that will 
provide adequate indications of possible local mismanagement and, more importantly, 
impending financial distress. It is important that much more effort and thought be put into 
developing and implementing a municipal financial reporting system that will be much 
more adequate in this regard than the present ‘non-system.’  Second, if municipal 
governments are given more scope for making their own decisions on what to do, some 
will undoubtedly make mistakes and in some instances perhaps even ‘bankrupt’ a locality.  
While some such errors are undoubtedly an essential part of ‘growing’ a more adequate 
urban governance and finance structure, it is important that how such mistakes should be 
dealt with is considered carefully as part of the needed rethinking of how India’s big cities 
can and should be run more effectively and efficiently. Under what circumstances if at all, 
for example, should municipal governments be taken over by  States? When a 
municipality cannot pay its debts or meet its current payroll, should it be ‘rescued’ by a 
State agency and placed in ‘trusteeship’ until its financial position is again sustainable? 
Such questions are not easy to answer in general anywhere, but they must nonetheless 
be thought given careful. 
   
 
V. Financing Urban Services: User Charges and Local Taxation 
 
 
  As emphasised earlier, an important rule of sound fiscal decentralisation is that 
finances should follow functions (Bahl, 2002).  Local governments need access to 
adequate revenue sources to finance the public services they are mandated to provide.  
In India, however, under funding of municipal services is a common feature.  Although all 
States have devolved the municipal functions listed in the Twelfth Schedule to a greater 
or a lesser degree, in the absence of adequate resources, municipal bodies have not 
been able to provide satisfactory levels of the assigned public services.  One reason is 
simply because the revenue handles assigned to them to carry out these functions are 
clearly inadequate.  At the same time, however, until now municipal bodies have neither 
taken the task of delivering public services sufficiently serious nor made adequate efforts 
to mobilise revenues efficiently from the sources assigned to them.  Similarly, there are 
also not yet in place properly designed systems of intergovernmental transfers to 
sufficiently  offset the fiscal disabilities of the municipal bodies to ensure minimum 
standards of important municipal services.  In total, the net result of assigning the   22 
constitutionally mandated functions to municipal bodies has thus been to impose 
unfunded mandates on them, as we discuss further in the next section. 
     
The consequence is that municipal services in India are significantly underfunded 
as mentioned in section 1 above.  The serious under-spending documented by Mohanty 
et al (2007) has resulted in such inadequate infrastructure and poor public service 
delivery by municipal bodies that it has seriously constrained the potential role of cities as 
centres of economic growth (India, 1996; Ramanathan and Dasgupta, 2009; 
Bandypodhyay and Rao, 2009). In 2005, the poor state of urban infrastructure and 
services was a major motivation for initiating a central programme, the Jawaharlal Nehru 
National Urban Renewal Mission ( JnNURM) with the  objective of improving 
developmental incentives by linking grants for urban renewal to reforms at both State and 
local levels aimed at improving fiscal efficiency of the urban local bodies, freeing urban 
land and housing markets, and preventing the municipal bodies and the  States from 
adopting protectionist policies.  The first phase of the programme is for the period 2005-
12.  Although in the first two years the progress was slow, the resource transfer from the 
centre has picked up.  Nevertheless, much more remains to be done to augment urban 
infrastructure and services.  Furthermore, the global financial crisis and the slowdown in 
the Indian economy as a consequence have recently led the central government to dilute 
the reform requirements in order to provide more immediate fiscal stimulus.  In particular, 
a considerable portion of J nNURM funds have recently been spent in purchasing buses 
for urban transport in order to revive the commercial automobile sector as a component 
of fiscal stimulus strategy.   Despite such shortcomings, as discussed further in the next 
section, the JnNURM approach may both foster urban renewal and motivate the States 
and local governments to undertake some of the reforms needed to generate significant 
own resources through the reform of property taxes and the liberalisation of land and 
housing markets.     
 
As mentioned earlier, a ccording to the principles of fiscal federalism, local 
services, by and large,  should be paid for, by local residents.   User charges are 
appropriate for financing locally provided services of a ‘private good’ nature.  Local public 
goods should be financed through local taxes, and the cost of financing services whose 
benefits spillover jurisdictions should be shared through specific purpose transfers.  
Additional  transfers from higher levels of government are required to offset the fiscal 
disabilities of jurisdictions with low revenue raising capacity and higher unit cost of 
providing services in order to enable comparable levels of public services at comparable 
tax rates.   Finally, large local capital expenditures producing a stream of benefits flowing 
over a number of years should be  financed through borrowing or perhaps the  proceeds 
from selling land or other assets belonging to the local government.   
 
  As with expenditures, revenue sources, capacities and patterns may differ vastly 
not only between different classes of municipal bodies but also within each class.  
Although the expenditure needs of large metropolitan governments are large, for example, 
so are their capacities to raise revenues.  To ensure that local decision-makers face hard 
budget constraints, it is important to avoid transfer dependency and bailouts.  To ensure 
efficiency and accountability, it is important that there is a strong linkage between  the 
expenditures incurred  on behalf of local residents  and the payments by way of user 
charges and taxes those residents make.  
   
  Statutorily, local governments in India cannot run deficits; they are required to 
restrict their expenditures to available revenues.  However, the absence of deficits in the   23 
municipal bodies does not mean  that the standards of public services are provided by 
them are even close to adequate.  As Mohanty et. al (2007) recently showed, for example, 
on average  30 large municipal  corporations  with more than one million population 
according to  Census 2001  were spending less than that one-quarter of the amount 
needed to provide the (inflation-adjusted) service norms set out almost 50 years ago by 
the  Zakaria  Committee (India, 1963). Municipal spending is  so low both because of 
problems in  mobilising own revenues and  the inadequacy of  transfers from central and 
State governments.   Unfortunately, reliable data on municipal finances are not available; 
for example, the data reported in the Finance Commission reports have several infirmities 
(Rao and Rao, 2007).  According to the information contained in the  Twelfth Finance 
Commission Report, in 2001-02 the aggregate revenues of urban local bodies as a ratio 
of GDP amounted to an abysmal 0.67 per cent while their own revenues were only 0.38 
per cent.  Information collected at NIPFP for the same year shows aggregate revenues 
marginally higher at 0.76  per cent  of GDP, with 0.26  per cent from tax devolution 
transfers and grants, and the balance from own revenues of urban local bodies at 0.51 
per cent (Mohanty et. al, 2007), of which local taxation accounted for 0.38 per cent and 
user charges 0.13 per cent. (India, 2007).  Such figures are very low in comparison with 
countries like Brazil, where municipal revenues account for 7.4  per cent of GDP, 
municipal own revenues for 2.58 per cent, and municipal taxes for 1.95 per cent (Afonso 
and Araujo, 2006). It is unsurprising that the standards of municipal services in India are 
abysmal.   
 
(i)   User Charges 
 
  In many respects, the most important source of finance at local levels should be 
from  user charges  imposed for  services  provided.  To a considerable extent a local 
government is like a business providing direct services in the form of ‘private goods’ (like 
water) to its customers -- local residents.  Financing such services through user fees or 
charges not only provides funds with which to supply such services but also provides 
invaluable information on which services should be provided, in what quantity and quality, 
and to whom.  Given the proximity to the population and the predominance of private 
good characteristics of many local services, levying user charges is feasible.  Often, 
however, it is complained that it is not possible to levy user charges when the quality of 
the services rendered is poor.  The result is that a vicious circle is set up, with low quality 
public services leading to an inability to collect user charges leading to further 
deterioration in the service levels. 
   
This circle needs to be broken, not only to get more revenues but also to improve 
standards of principal services.  User charges are especially important as for  providing 
signals to consumers of the  scarcity value of the services and to providers about the 
demands that need to be met through service provision.  Establishing this strong  link 
between demand and supply both helps to generate resources and ensures efficiency in 
production  and accountability in service delivery. User charges are particularly relevant 
for services such as water, sewers,  electricity, garbage disposal, public transit, and 
recreation.   User charges are more important in large metropolitan areas.  Marginal cost 
pricing will  improve efficiency by imposing  higher charges o n  far away consumers.  
However, if poorer people live further away and congestion is serious in  metropolitan 
centres, it may sometimes be argued that it might be advisable to charge more uniform 
(average cost) prices throughout the urban region for certain services even at the price of 
perpetuating (and encouraging) some continued inefficiency in urban land use, 
transportation patterns, and the allocation of urban public sector resources. Of course,   24 
this is very much a ‘second-best’ approach, and depends very much upon the physical 
and social characteristics of each city.  Marginal cost pricing of the ‘disservice’ provided 
by congestion (as discussed later) combined with marginal cost pricing of other services 
would clearly be preferable but seems unlikely to be feasible soon in most large Indian 
cities. 
   
At present, urban fees are not significant in India, with the proceeds from non-tax 
revenues from  all  urban local bodies amounting to a mere 0.13  per cent of GDP.   
Mohanty et. al (2007) show that in 10 large municipal corporations less than 10 per cent 
of the cost of providing services was recovered through fees;  in another  six, cost 
recovery was between 10 to 20 per cent.  Only in two of the 25  municipal corporations 
examined was cost recovery greater than 75 per cent.  Interestingly, on the whole cost 
recovery was relatively greater in those cities in which the estimated normative under-
spending was lower.  If low cost recovery and poor service quality are thus connected, it 
may prove possible to collect more user charges, especially if the quality of the services 
provided  can be  improved  – for example, by well-directed transfer payments, as 
discussed in a later section. 
 
Other  important sources of  non-tax revenues  are  licence fees for shops and 
establishments and parking fees.  A common feature seen virtually in every urban local 
body, particularly in large corporations is the poor implementation of regulations relating 
to land use and commercial space occupation.  Both  the present system of  issuing 
licences and  the common  flouting of regulations by shops and establishments provide 
enormous rent seeking opportunities.  Public interest litigation relating to the construction 
and running of businesses in residential areas  against  the regulations  led to the 
demolition of several shops and establishments in Delhi in 2005.  In some cities, from 
time to time, the poor implementation of the regulations  has been accompanied by 
periodic amnesties that legalise them after the fact, favouring in particular the  politically 
well connected and powerful.  For instance, recently the State government of Karnataka 
attempted to pass an ordinance regularising 7000,000 illegal constructions within the 
Bangalore Municipal Corporation area on the eve of an election to the municipal body.  
The scheme  (called the  Akrama-Sakrama Scheme) was approved by the  State cabinet 
but  in the end did not receive the approval of the Governor  on the grounds that the 
government should pass the legislation and not simply pass an ordinance. 
 
Finally, r evenue from parking  fees in major metropolitan cities could generate 
substantial revenues.  The  main rationales for  levying parking fees  are  to  reduce 
congestion of vehicles on the roads and  to  generate resources to construct parking 
spaces. At first glance, these two objectives may seem contradictory since increasing 
parking spaces in itself might seem more likely to induce rather than reduce road 
congestion.  However, in most metropolitan cities in India, the combination of the  poor 
quality of public transportation system, inadequate provision of parking spaces for 
vehicles and the present negligible charges for parking either legally or illegally, results in  
large scale traffic congestion on roads.  With sharp increases in household incomes and 
the emergence of a large middle class,  the number of vehicles  is going to  increase 
sharply in the coming years.  Introducing as part of a more rational road and urban policy 
a more comprehensive policy of charging parking fees in accordance with the scarcity 
value of open spaces in cities should both reduce traffic and at the same time generate 
revenues to construct multi-storeyed parking places.  Creating better  parking 
infrastructure in  the central business district of  major metropolitan cities  may be an   25 
appropriate area in which to explore  the  public-private partnership approach to capital 
finance discussed in the next section.    
 
(ii)   Local Taxation 
 
  Reliable and effective local taxation is essential to ensure hard-budget 
constraints in financing local public goods (Oates, 2005). In particular, it is important that 
local governments  have  adequate  tax powers to ensure a strong linkage between 
revenue and expenditure decision at the margin (Bird and Smart, 2009).   
 
  Which taxes are best suited at local levels?  On the whole, the fiscal federalism 
literature suggests that not only should governments (at all levels) bear clear public 
responsibility at the margin for financing expenditures for which they are politically 
responsible but that, ideally, local own-source revenues should be sufficient to enable at 
least the richest local government to finance from its own resources  at least those 
services that they provide  which  primarily benefit their residents.  Indeed, to avoid 
distorting the allocation of resources, to the extent possible local taxes should burden 
only local residents, preferably in relation to the benefits they receive from the services 
provided.  For this reason, in general immobile tax bases are best suited at the local level 
because taxes on mobile bases may result in their migration from higher to lower taxed 
localities and even result in a “race to the bottom”.  However, in many cases, particularly 
in larger cities,  taxing immobile bases  alone  will not yield the revenues required to 
provide local public goods and services, some of which benefit mobile factors. Indeed, as 
Oates (1999, p. 1125) says,”…on efficiency grounds decentralised governments should 
tax mobile economic units with benefit levies.”  Determining an appropriate tax structure 
for local governments thus requires a careful compromise between fiscal autonomy and 
tax efficiency.  
 
A local tax  designed to satisfy these requirements  should in principle have the 
following characteristics (Bird 2006):  
 
•  The base should be relatively immobile to allow the local authorities to  vary 
the rates without losing the base. 
•  The tax should yield adequate revenues to meet local needs and should be 
sufficiently buoyant overtime.  
•  The tax should be stable and predictable overtime.  
•  It should not be possible to export the tax burden to non-residents except to 
the extent that such burdens capture benefits non-residents obtain from local 
services. 
•  The tax base should be visible to ensure accountability. 
•  The taxpayers should perceive the tax to be reasonably fair. 
•  The tax should be relatively easy to administer. 
 
  Based on the above considerations, Bird and Slack (2007)  review the various 
possible candidates for local taxes.    The most appropriate tax at the local level is clearly 
the tax on real properties not only because real property is immobile but also because to 
a considerable extent differences in service levels are reflected in property values so that 
the tax on real property  is like  a benefit tax.  In addition,  income taxes generate 
significant revenues for local governments in  many OECD countries, and a good case 
can be made for a supplemental  local income tax to supplement property taxes   26 
particularly in metropolitan areas in which local governments provide substantial services 
to people (health, welfare) that are not significantly capitalised into property values; in 
effect, the local income tax might serve as a kind of (very rough) benefit tax with respect 
to such services.  The best way to levy an income tax at the local level is to ‘piggyback’ it 
on higher level income taxes so that, although some flexibility with respect to the tax rate 
can be given to local governments, the determination of the base and tax administration 
will remain at the higher level.   A local payroll tax may be easier to administer but it is 
generally not a good idea since it acts as a tax barrier to employment and may reduce 
the employment intensity of production.  Another tax often used at the local level is some 
form of  sales or consumption tax, including selective taxes on  (for example) 
entertainment services and hotels.  Finally, a number of countries have local business 
taxes that take such forms as corporate income  tax, differentially heavy non-residential 
property tax, transit taxes such as octroi and entry tax, and various forms of  gross 
receipts and crude sales or ’industry and commerce’ taxes (Bird, 2003).   Most of these 
local business taxes involve significant exportation of tax burden to non-residents, are 
costly to administer, and impose substantial compliance burdens. 
   
In India, municipal bodies can levy and collect only those taxes that are specified 
by the State governments from the State List in the Seventh Schedule to the constitution.  
Although the taxing powers assigned  are non-uniform across States, on the whole the 
most important tax bases assigned to municipal governments include (i) taxes on lands 
and buildings (49), the tax on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or 
sale which is known as octroi (52), (iii) taxes on luxuries including those on entertainment, 
amusement, betting and gambling (55),  (iv) taxes on advertisements other than 
advertisements published in newspapers, or broadcast in radio or television (55), (v) 
taxes on non-motorised vehicles (57), (vi) taxes on animals and boats, (vii) tolls, and (viii) 
taxes on professions, trades, callings and employment.   
 
In actual practice, however, most of these taxes are simply not levied.  The most 
important tax actually levied at the local level is undoubtedly that on land and buildings 
(real properties).  Octroi was an important source of municipal revenue in some  States 
until recently, but as the tax was considered obnoxious, distorting, iniquitous, and a major 
source of corruption, it is not surprising that all  States except Maharashtra have 
abolished the tax and even in Maharashtra, the tax is levied only in municipal 
corporations.  Some  States replaced octroi with entry tax which is not much better in 
economic terms and is also an impediment to internal trade.  In most cases, even when 
the States replaced octroi by entry tax, they did not compensate municipal governments 
for the loss of revenue.  Generally, when  States abolished octroi, they provided no 
alternative source of revenue  and simply increased the size of the unfunded mandates 
confronting  municipal governments.  In a few  States, however, municipal governments 
have some access to consumption taxes.   In Kerala, for instance, the power to levy 
entertainment tax is given to the urban local governments.  In Andhra Pradesh, local 
governments receive a fixed share of the revenue from entertainment tax.  In a few 
States, urban local bodies collect some revenue from advertisement tax.   
 
 
Although the property tax is the most important source of own revenues of 
municipal bodies, it suffers from several infirmities as evidenced by the generally poor 
collections and low buoyancy of this tax. However, initiatives in some municipal 
corporations in recent years have shown that revenues from this tax can be substantially 
increased  with p roper reform of the tax system.  Bruhat Bangalore M ahanagara Palike    27 
(Greater Bangalore M unicipal Corporation), for example, reformed its property tax  by 
revising the area-based values, introducing a self-assessment system and improving the 
technology of the payments system with the result that revenue increased from Rs. 4,400 
million in 2007-08 to Rs. 7,800 million in 2008-09 and is expected to further increase to 
Rs. 10,000 million in 2009-10. 
 
The starting point for property tax reform in India was the introduction of area-
based  assessment to determine the tax base  by the Patna Municipal Corporation in 
1992-93.  Previously,  the tax was collected on the basis of the annual rental value, 
defined as gross annual value rent at which the property may ‘reasonably’ be expected to 
be rented out.  This system gave enormous discretion to the tax collectors and yielded 
little in tax revenue. The prescription of unit values (per square foot) based on the area of 
location and type of construction of the property instead of the annual rental value 
removed  most of  the discretion from the tax collectors and  resulted in such a large 
increase in base that the   tax rate  was reduced  from 44  per cent to 9  per cent.
4  
Subsequently, municipal corporations in a number of States adopted the Patna model. In 
Bangalore, for example,  properties are classified into different zones based on the 
guidance values set by the Department of Stamps and Registration.  For each zone, 
rental value per square foot was determined on the basis of  type  and quality of 
construction and age of the buildings.  A handbook was brought out detailing the above 
so that each individual property owner would compute his tax liability simply by plugging 
in the location, type of construction and sq. feet area of his property, and then pay the tax 
online.  Similar reforms in other urban local bodies might also double their revenues from 
property tax. 
 
  A major weakness of this system, however, is the need to revise the unit values 
periodically in keeping with changes i n prices.  In the absence of periodic revision, 
revenues will not respond to changes in the values of properties, and the buoyancy of the 
tax will depend only upon the addition of new properties.  As a rule, it is politically difficult 
to change the values periodically.  One way to overcome this problem might be to link the 
guided values automatically to the index of property values in various cities determined 
by the National Housing Bank. This system could be expanded if States would initiate the 
estimation of price changes on real property in every urban local body based on the 
methodology adopted by the National Housing Bank and  then  link the guided values 
automatically to the price index to estimate the tax liability.   
 
Some important lessons from the Bangalore experiment in the reform of property 
tax must be noted.  First, the system should be simple and transparent enough to be 
easily understood by the general public.  Second, there should be clarity in the reform 
process with thorough public discussion and debate  when  the reform is adopted.  It is 
important for the tax department to provide  prompt and clear answers to queries by the 
general public in newspapers, videos, and audio channels.  It is  also  important to 
facilitate online payment of the tax so that the taxpayer does not have to be in contact 
with the tax collector.  Computation of the property tax liability based on the guided 
values and online payment of the tax obviates the need for taxpayers to go to the tax 
department and face harassment simply in order to pay the tax.   
 
                                                 
4 In view of the very considerable degree of under-spending in Patna – the worse of the 30 cities 
examined by Mohanty et al (2007) -- its pioneering role in property tax reform has apparently not 
been carried through over time in a way that sustains municipal revenues.   28 
Another major reform needed in the property tax system is the expansion of the 
tax base.  The Administrative Reforms Commission has noted that only about 60-70 per 
cent of the properties in urban areas are actually assessed.   A large number of property 
owners seem to be simply not paying the tax although they benefit from the local public 
services.  The Commission recommended the matching of the properties paying the tax 
with those in the Geographical Information System ( GIS) to identify those that are not 
paying the tax.  In fact,  BBMP has undertaken  has undertaken this exercise for all 
properties within its 800 sq. kilometre area.  By matching the actual properties paying the 
tax, excluding government buildings and slums, it is possible to identify the properties 
evading the tax.  The Bangalore reform experiment is worth emulating in other municipal 
corporations and municipalities. 
 
One reason for  widespread evasion  is because much new construction as well 
as additions to existing buildings have been done without getting proper approval.  Some 
have expressed the  fear that allowing such properties to pay the tax could mean giving 
them legal recognition.  It is important to keep these two issues separate.  It is also 
important  to examine the nature of violations.  In general, if  violations are not major, 
property owners should be allowed to pay the penalty and regularise them.  On the other 
hand, in cases where the violations are major, the structures should be demolished.   
 
Apart from the property tax, which is potentially a good source of local revenues 
but definitely needs to be reformed substantially, larger cities in particular are likely to 
need some additional broad-based tax source, such as a supplemental rate 
‘piggybacked’ on a national or  State tax and administered with that tax, but with the 
proceeds going to the local government. Any such local rates should be set within 
predetermined limits.  A ceiling is needed to prevent localities from ‘exporting’ tax 
burdens ( in excess of benefits received) to non-residents and a floor to prevent richer 
areas from ‘stealing’ tax base from poorer areas. 
 
In  India, at present the  centre can levy  income tax  only  on non-agricultural 
incomes. The power to levy the tax on agricultural income is vested with the States and 
the latter have not levied  the tax except on  income from the plantation sector.  Ideally, 
this distinction between  sources of income should be done away with to have 
comprehensive income as the tax base while making a dequate provision for insuring 
fluctuations in agricultural incomes and  allowing carry over losses.  If and when such a 
tax exists, and is operating relatively well on a comprehensive income base determined 
by the Centre, presumably both State and even some larger local governments might be 
allowed to piggyback their rates subject to a ceiling rate.  Such a system would reduce 
the scope for evasion and avoidance of income tax, provide a stable source of revenue to 
both  State and local governments and  in particular  provide  large business and 
manufacturing centres like Mumbai with funds to maintain and upgrade their 
infrastructure to sustain their key role in India’s national economic dynamism.  However, 
before such measures can be considered many changes would have  to  take place not 
only at the  constitutional level but also, equally importantly, in terms of political 
willingness to tax adequately and properly at all levels of government.  Finally, major 
efforts would also be required to ensure that the central income tax system was 
functioning properly before it was further complicated by adding on such sub-national 
components.  
 
Of more immediate interest is the possibility that a surcharge on the consumption 
tax  might perhaps be  an important additional source of revenue for the municipal   29 
governments.  The consensus is that there will be a dual GST  – one at the  Centre and 
another at the State level.  By and large there will be uniformity in the tax base and rates.  
As the economy is gearing up to move over to the goods and services tax (GST) at both 
Central and State levels, it would in principle be feasible to levy a small surcharge on the 
State GST.   In fact, even in the prevailing  State VAT, Gujarat decided to impose an 
additional one  percentage point levy o n the sales tax and earmark the levy for 
compensating the municipal corporations for the loss of revenue by abolishing octroi.  As 
the present consumption tax system is replaced by the GST regime, the possibility of 
providing some additional revenue to local governments by (as in Japan, for example) 
levying an additional percentage point for this purpose at either the central level or 
perhaps as each  state decides at the  State level, and  then  distributing the revenues to 
localities by formula might perhaps  be considered.  Conceivably, some  States may 
perhaps even want to consider allowing at least the large metropolitan areas to 
‘piggyback’ an additional rate of their own on the State tax base but this is unlikely to be a 
good idea given the complexities involved in making such a system work
5 Firm estimates 
of GST base are not available but a conservative estimate made at NIPFP for 2007-08 
put the GST base at Rs. 16,000 billion after adjusting for the prevailing exemptions (Rao 
and Chakraborty, 2010).  A one per cent levy on this base would yield Rs. 160 billion for 
municipal governments  which is about 0.34  per cent of GDP.  Since e ven the most 
optimistic estimate of revenue from property tax is just about 0.2 per cent of GDP (Mathur, 
Thakur and Rajyadhyaksha, 2009), a one per cent levy on the GST could yield virtually 
double the amount collected from property tax.  This  possible important  source  of 
revenue deserves to be considered seriously in the immediate future.  
 
 As a final note on  local taxes, it is particularly important that States cease  the 
pernicious practice of abolishing  local taxes without providing adequate substitute 
sources of revenue to  municipalities.  For example, the  Gujarat government abolished 
octroi to fulfil its election promise without any mechanism to compensate the municipal 
corporations, although later they decided to levy a one percentage point additional rate 
on the sales tax.  Rajasthan and Haryana simply abolished the property tax without even 
consulting the urban local governments.  Punjab put the threshold for the property tax so 
high that almost two-thirds of the properties are exempted. Since property tax is the only 
important tax for municipal governments, when a State government abolishes or severely 
restricts this tax, it is deliberately disempowering its municipalities. 
    
 
VI. Financing Urban Services: Intergovernmental Transfers 
 
 
  In principle, municipal governments should raise revenues to finance local public 
services from their residents.  In reality, however, not only is the assignment of revenue 
powers generally inadequate  but in many cases municipalities do not have tax bases 
large enough  to generate the required revenues.  Transfers from higher levels of 
government either by way of tax devolution or grants are therefore found in every country, 
as are specific purpose transfers intended to ensure minimum standards of services for 
those with significant benefit spillovers.   
                                                 
5 Even Canada, which makes considerable use of such provincial ‘piggyback’ rates on its central 
GST as described in detail in Bird and Gendron (2009), has not considered, and is unlikely to 
consider, extending this facility below the level of the province.    
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(i)   General Grants 
 
  In  the  Indian context,  under  Article 243 (1) of the constitution, the  State 
governments are required to appoint a State Finance Commission (SFC) every five years 
to determine: 
 
•  the distribution between the State government and the municipalities of the 
net proceeds of the taxes, duties, tolls, and fees that can be levied by the 
State which may be divided between them, and the allocation of such 
proceeds between the municipalities at all levels; 
•  the determination of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees which may be assigned 
to, or appropriated by the municipalities; 
•  the grants-in-aid to the municipalities from the consolidated fund of the state; 
•  the measures needed to improve the financial position of the municipalities; 
and  
•  any other matter referred to the SFC by the Governor in the interest of sound 
finance of municipalities.     
 
After the 74
th  Amendment to the  constitution,  the terms of reference to the 
Central Finance Commissions (CFC) were amended under Article 280 (3) (cc) to include 
an additional clause to make recommendations on the “measures needed to augment the 
Consolidated Fund of the State to supplement the resources of the municipalities in the 
State on the basis of the recommendations made by the Finance Commission of the 
State.”   In fact, however, the CFCs could not make recommendations on the reports of 
the SFCs in part because there was no coordination of the timing of the submission of the 
reports of the SFCs  with the result that their reports were simply not available to the 
CFCs.  In any case, many SFC reports were simply unusable, either because they were 
not accepted for implementation by the  States or because the methodology employed 
was not only not uniform but also left much to be desired.   
 
  The Twelfth Finance Commission at the Centre reviewed the progress in setting 
up SFCs as well as their recommendations and concluded that (i) several States did not 
appoint the SFCs on a regular basis; (ii) in many States the recommendations of the SFC 
were simply not followed up; and (iii) even when they were accepted by the governments, 
they were not fully implemented in  either  letter  or spirit and the annual budgetary 
allocations were often well short of the recommendations.  In many cases, the SFCs 
appointed did not have the expertise to undertake the technical exercises required to 
estimate the requirements of the municipalities.  Furthermore, in most states, the 
information and data required to undertake technical exercises either do not exist or the 
SFCs do not have the time or capacity to collect the information required to undertake the 
task.  Not surprisingly, the transfer system to  municipalities suffers from several 
shortcomings in most states and is ad hoc, inadequate, opaque, and often discretionary.  
The  objective of  providing an objective and scientific basis  for such  transfers by 
appointing SFCs has definitely not been achieved. 
 
  Since the CFCs are unable to take account of the recommendations of the SFCs, 
they simply set some token amount for municipal grants in their recommendations.  For 
instance, the Eleventh Finance Commission recommended a grant of Rs. 20 billion for 
the five years, 2000-05 and the Twelfth Finance Commission recommended Rs. 50 billion 
grants to urban local bodies for the period, 2005-10.   31 
 
The upshot is that the block transfers given to urban local governments from both 
the Centre and States are wholly inadequate and bear no relationship to their expenditure 
needs.  The constitution provides for the appointment of State Finance Commissions to 
determine the requirements of urban local bodies.  However, State governments do not 
take this task seriously when it comes to appointing the Commission or considering their 
recommendations.  SFCs are ill equipped to undertake the difficult task of assessing the 
revenue potential and expenditure needs of the municipal governments.  Not only that 
most of them do not have the professional capacity to undertake the task, but  the 
information and data required for the purpose are not collected regularly or reliably. The 
result is that  the grants given are not only grossly inadequate but also are  ad hoc and 
usually based on past trends.  After transfers, as before, urban local bodies are left with 
large unfunded mandates and woefully inadequate public services.  
   
(ii)   Specific Purpose Grants 
 
  Most  specific purpose grants are given by  central government ministries for 
various central sector and centrally sponsored schemes.   The major  specific purpose 
transfer  for urban local bodies is under the Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission 
(JnNURM) in which grants are given to upgrade the urban infrastructure on the condition 
that the States and the municipalities will undertake reforms.    As mentioned earlier, this 
ambitious programme is designed to augment urban infrastructure and services and is 
linked to a reform agenda that includes doing away with urban land ceiling act and rent 
control act as well as reforms in property tax etc.  The Government of India proposes to 
spend about Rs. 500 billion during 2006-12 with matching contributions from cities/States.  
In Track I, under J nNURM, assistance to augment urban infrastructure will be given for 
63 identified cities to enable planned development of the cities, ensure integrated 
development of urban infrastructure and ensure provision of urban services to the poor.  
Under  Track II, assistance under  Urban Infrastructure Development Schemes for Small 
and Medium Towns ( UIDSSMT) and  Integrated Housing and Slum Development 
Programmes (IHSDP) will be extended to other cities.   
 
  The admissible components for assistance under J nNURM include urban 
renewal, sewerage and water supply, solid waste management, storm water drainage, 
urban transport, parking spaces on PPP basis, development of heritage areas, 
prevention and rehabilitation of soil erosion, and preservation of water bodies.   As 
mentioned earlier, the grants u nder the scheme are linked to reforms both at the  State 
and at municipal level.  Municipal level reforms include introduction of an  accrual based 
accounting system, reform of the property tax by using GIS information, levying user 
charges to recover 100  per cent of operation and maintenance charges,  provision of 
basic services to urban poor, and internal earmarking of budgets for this purpose.  State 
level reforms under J nNURM include  enactment of public disclosure law, full 
implementation of the provisions of 74
th Constitutional Amendment including the setting 
up of District Planning Committees (DPC) and Metropolitan Planning Committees (MPC), 
enactment of community participation law, associating elected representatives with the 
function of city planning, repeal of urban land ceiling act and reform of rent control act, 
and rationalisation of stamp duty to bring it down to no more than 5  per cent within the 
next five years.  In addition, there are optional reforms relating to revision of bye-laws, 
simplification  of legal and  procedural frameworks for conversion of agricultural land for 
non-agricultural purposes, earmarking 20-25 per cent of developed land for economically 
weaker sections (EWS) of the population, introduction  of computerised process of   32 
registration of real properties, making water harvesting mandatory in all buildings, and 
bye-laws to introduce re-cycling of water, encouraging public-private partnerships, and 
sundry  structural and administrative reforms.  The  grant and loan portions and the 
matching ratios for the Centre, State and local bodies (including parastatals and financial 
institutions) are shown in the following table. 
 
Financing Pattern for JNURM 
(Per cent of Total Project Cost) 
Grant  Urban Infrastructure and Governance 






Cities with more than 4 million population  35  15  50 
Cities with more than  one million but less 
than 4 million population 
50  20  30 
Cities in North-eastern States and Jammu 
and Kashmir 
90  10  - 
Other Cities  80  10  10 
Setting up desalination plants  80  10  10 
 
  JnNURM is clearly a comprehensive specific purpose scheme for urban renewal 
and infrastructure support.  Indeed, it is if anything too comprehensive and might perhaps 
have been more  effectively focused on a shorter and more easily attainable list of 
objectives. In any case, not that much has yet happened since states have so far been 
reluctant to  undertake reforms and  avail the assistance.  In the first year (2005-06) of 
operation, the revised estimate of grants was just about 15.6  per cent of the budget 
estimate.  In the second year, although the estimate increased to 78 per cent of budget, 
the total amount disbursed was less than Rs. 36 billion.  Since 2008-09, however, actual 
disbursements have increased sharply.  Unfortunately, this increase in part reflects some 
dilution of reform content and  in  part the fact that the funds were liberally used to 
purchase buses in municipal corporation areas as a part of the fiscal stimulus to the 
commercial vehicles sector.  Putting more buses on already overcrowded urban streets is 
perhaps more likely to increase than to reduce congestion and other ongoing urban 
management problems.  More fundamentally, the reluctance of States to undertake the 
pro-market reforms called for by JnNURM is a matter for concern.    
 
 
VII. Financing Urban Infrastructure 
 
 
  If India’s cities are to be centres of dynamism in the country, considerable 
investment in augmenting urban infrastructure and services is unavoidable. As mentioned 
above, reforms in user charges, property tax, and the transfer system as well as perhaps 
additional funding through a ‘local’ surcharge on the GST  can do much to  bring about 
significant  improvement in the resources required for basic  urban  public  services and 
maintenance expenditures. However, substantial improvements in  urban infrastructure 
will require resources well beyond the capacity of even the best run urban local bodies to 
generate.  International  experience  shows that major capital  works in urban areas are 
often financed at least in part from central funds, and this seems right when some of the 
benefits from such works may be felt nationally, as well as locally.  The major effects of 
urban infrastructure projects, however, are clearly felt locally and the major benefits are   33 
reaped, usually through  capitalisation  in local property values,  by local residents 
(including local businesses as well as households).  It thus seems only right that much of 
the cost should also  be substantially b orne by local residents.  Four ways to finance 
major capital expenditures are discussed briefly  below: l ocal borrowing;  levying 
developmental charges in the residents; selling land and other assets; and public-private 
partnerships.    
 
(i)   Borrowing 
 
  When the benefits from infrastructure projects are enjoyed over a period of time, 
it may be both fair and efficient to finance such projects in part or whole by borrowing.  
Moreover, borrowing may be the only practical way to finance large capital projects 
without large and undesirable fluctuations in local tax rates from year to year.  However, 
municipalities in India can contract loans only if they are permitted to do so by the State 
government.
6  In most cases, the State governments have to guarantee local borrowings, 
in which case  the loan  becomes the liability of the  State and is included in the overall 
ceiling under the respective fiscal responsibility legislations.  States are reluctant to 
guarantee municipal bonds because their fiscal responsibility legislation requires them to 
limit their committed liabilities to half a per cent of Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) 
and their fiscal deficit at 3  per cent of GSDP.
7  Municipal corporations must thus issue 
bonds on the strength of their own credit rating rather than based on State government 
guarantees.   
    
The  State governments permit urban local governments to borrow  under their 
respective municipal laws, which lay down the framework for borrowing: the projects for 
which the borrowing is allowed, the  volume of borrowing and the security to be pledged, 
the procedure for applying to the State for the permission to borrow, and the manner in 
which  accounts must be kept.  If local bodies borrow without  State government 
guarantees, generally  they  must place s ome revenue stream in escrow in order to 
guarantee the service of the debt. In most cases, State governments only allow municipal 
corporations to borrow from the market-based on the value of their real property tax base.  
Most States have issued guidelines for local borrowing such as that borrowing should be 
for less than 30 years,  that  the interest rate should not exceed interest rate on 
government securities and that there should be sufficient provisioning for debt servicing.   
 
The practice of municipal corporations accessing funds from the capital market is 
relatively recent.  By and large, most borrowing by municipal corporations has been from 
public institutions such as Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) or Life 
Insurance Corporation (LIC) for housing and water supply schemes.  After the Credit 
                                                 
6 In fact, under Article 293 of the constitution, even State governments have to seek the permission 
of the central government to borrow if they are indebted to the latter.  The pattern of plan financing 
until 2004-05 necessarily implied that the States are indebted to the Centre since it involved a large 
proportion of plan assistance given as Central loans to States. Hence when states borrow from the 
market, in effect the Union Finance Ministry, Planning Commission and the Reserve Bank of India, 
really determine the allocation of market borrowing to each of the States. 
7 The 3 per cent GSDP target recommended by the Twelfth Finance Commission was supposed to 
be reached by 2009-10.  However, the Government of India raised the fiscal deficit limit to 3.5 per 
cent and later to 4 per cent of GSDP in 2008-09 as a part of its fiscal stimulus package, and many 
States have revised their targets accordingly.  The Twelfth Finance Commission also 
recommended that  States should e nact fiscal responsibility legislation; 28  States, with the 
exceptions of Sikkim and West Bengal, have done so.     34 
Rating Information Services Ltd (CRISIL)  began  credit rating  municipal corporations in 
1996, the groundwork necessary for the municipal bond market was  established.  
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was the first municipal entity to issue Rs. 1 billion 
bond with the credit rating of A+.  Subsequently, other credit rating agencies also have 
joined the business of rating municipal corporations and a number of municipal 
corporations have issued bonds, p articularly after the Ministry of Urban Development 
issued guidelines for tax-free municipal bonds.  The critical requirement for issuance of 
such bonds is that the municipal corporation issuing the bonds is required to maintain a 
debt-service coverage ratio of at least 1.25 throughout the period.
 8    
 
Despite these developments, not much has happened in the municipal bond 
market in India.  The volume of bonds issued has been very small, and the trading in 
bonds very thin.   In total, only nine municipal corporations have  so far issued bonds 
amounting to Rs.  6.2 billion, in part because few can fulfil the  over-collaterisation 
condition mentioned above.  Although so far the amount of resources raised for 
investment from the bond market by the municipal corporations is small, with the 
exception of the bonds issued by Bangalore Municipal Corporation and Indore Municipal 
Corporation, all others were issued on their own strength and not based on  State 
government guarantee.  So long as there is no state bailout, as time goes on the 
demonstration effect may lead to still more municipal recourse to borrowing for capital 
finance. Furthermore, another impetus for widening and deepening the bond market is 
that under the J nNURM the  Centre and  States will together provide  50  per cent of the 
resources required for investment in urban infrastructure as grants, provided the other 50 
per cent is generated or borrowed by the municipal corporation. 
 
(ii)   Development Charges 
 
  One way to finance basic urban  infrastructure, particularly in new areas being 
developed within the areas covered by municipal bodies, is to levy development charges 
based on the land area being developed.  This is a one-time levy imposed on property 
developers  (including  development  authorities)  to finance  growth-related capital costs 
relating to the area where the development takes place.  The objective is to finance the 
infrastructure associated with the new development project by taxing those who are 
presumed to benefit directly in the form of increased p roperty values as a result of the 
new infrastructure.  Generally, the developers recover the amount by charging the 
property owners based on the land area owned by them in the new development project. 
Who ultimately bears the cost of course depends on the demand and supply conditions 
for land and housing in the area.  On the whole, however, in view of the relative scarcity 
of land and  the strong demand for land and houses in urban areas, in most cases 
presumably d evelopment charges are ultimately borne by t he buyers.  When well-
designed and implemented, development charges in effect amount to a form of marginal 
cost pricing of urban infrastructure and  may thus encourage more orderly and efficient 
development of urban agglomerations.   
 
  As mentioned,  development charges  are feasible in newly developed areas 
within urban agglomerations.  However, in places where parallel development authorities 
have been set up to create housing infrastructure, the charges are collected by them and 
not by the municipal bodies.    Unfortunately from the perspective of sensible urban 
                                                 
8 Debt-service coverage ratio is defined as the ratio of net income (after meeting all obligations) to 
long term debt service obligations.   35 
finance and planning, such  authorities are  directly responsible to the respective  State 
governments  and  not to the  municipal body concerned.
9  Dividing up capital and 
operational functions and finances i n this way may make it more difficult to develop 
coherent urban policies.  
  
(iii)   Proceeds from Sale of Land and Buildings 
 
  In all urban areas, given the high growth of urban population, land for housing 
and for commercial purposes is scarce.  In many u rban agglomerations, as  just 
mentioned, development authorities have been set up to acquire land and to develop it 
either  for sale or  to directly  build affordable houses for the poor and middle income 
groups
10    They acquire land from private owners, mostly  agricultural lands in the 
surrounding areas, put the basic infrastructure in place, and sell them for housing or 
commercial building purposes.  Generally, they generate considerable surpluses which 
could be used to improve infrastructure and services in municipal areas. 
 
  Despite what was just said about the scarcity of land for housing and commercial 
purposes in most cities, in fact there is often considerable such land potentially available 
in urban areas, much of which is owned by public sector agencies such as railways and 
defence as well as by municipal bodies themselves. An essential first step is to make a 
complete inventory of land available for development and sale in municipal areas.  Once 
this is done, it may be possible in many cases to develop such lands, sell them, and use 
the proceeds  to  finance urban infrastructure.  In the case of the defence sector,  for 
example, when cantonments were initially created they were outside cities.  However, as 
cities expanded over the years, they have come within the urban agglomeration.  
Cantonments run their own systems of service delivery including schools and hospitals 
and  can  certainly  be located outside the city limits, reducing the  risk  to the safety of 
civilians at the same time.   The central government, with co-operation from the  State 
governments, should  take action to relocate such  establishments, with t he  State 
government or the municipal corporation  paying for t he cost of land acquisition and 
redevelopment.  The relocation of defence establishments could release large chunks of 
land and thus help reduce skyrocketing real estate prices.  The proceeds from the sale of 
these properties can be used for the redevelopment of defence establishments outside 
the city, and the surplus revenue after meeting the  redevelopment cost  may be 
earmarked for augmenting urban infrastructure and services.   
 
Much the same could be done with  vacant land belonging to  other agencies 
which could also, after proper development, be  disposed of, and the  proceeds shared 
between the municipal body and other owners.  When the development of infrastructure 
by the municipal body increases  the  capital value of  such  land, any gains realised 
through sale should be shared with the municipal body  that has increased the  urban 
infrastructure and services in the area.  Of course, all these issues are contentious, and 
consensus on them will not be easy to achieve.  Nonetheless,  if  Centre and  State 
governments can cooperate in doing so, it should certainly be possible to work out a 
formula for sharing the proceeds from the sale of land.     
 
                                                 
9 The Delhi Development Authority until recently was not even accountable to the Delhi State 
administration but was under the Union Home Ministry.  
10 In some instances, the development authority has ended up acting as a monopoly agency, thus 
restricting the supply of housing in cities and defeating its original purpose.    36 
(iv)   Public–Private Partnerships 
 
Getting different components of the public sector to cooperate is sometimes so 
difficult that many may think a better approach might be to deal with the private sector.  
Indeed, public-private p artnerships (PPPs)  may  have  significant potential for financing 
and delivery of urban services.   For example, the  private sector may be asked to 
contribute funds for specified services in return for certain rights or future incomes.  There 
are many services such as water supply sewerage, solid waste management, 
recreational facilities, rain water harvesting, and urban transportation where public-private 
partnerships are eminently feasible, in principle. 
   
Indeed, PPPs have a number of potential advantages in delivering urban public 
services.  First, the urban local government does not have to spend the money upfront.  
Second,  contracting out services  may result in greater efficiency as better service 
delivery.  Empirical studies show that contracting out generally results in lowering of unit 
costs of services (Kitchen, 2002).  In India, Chennai was the first city to embark on the 
initiative to contract out municipal solid waste management services to a foreign private 
agency- ONYX, a Singapore based company. The scope  of privatisation includes 
activities such as sweeping, collection, storing, transporting of municipal solid waste and 
creating public awareness in three municipal zones. ONYX collects about 1100  metric 
tons of waste from three zones per day and transports it to open dumps.  This experiment 
holds a lot of promise for other municipal corporations and municipalities as well.  A 
number of other municipalities have contracted out waste disposal and solid waste 
management to the private sector including the NGOs.  
 
Another example of successful PPP is in the provision of water supply in Hubli-
Dharwar, Belgaum and Gulbarga cities of Karnataka  State.  Residents of these cities 
used to get water supply for only one or two hours a day.   However, the PPP 
arrangement, undertaken on a pilot basis to cover about 2 lakh residents in the  three 
cities, enabled  them to enjoy the benefits of 24X7 water supply with  a state of the art 
water distribution system and at little additional cost.  The private partner in this case is a 
French water company ‘Veolia Water’ which was entrusted with the task of providing 100 
per cent metered customer connections.  The responsibility for providing adequate supply 
of bulk water was entrusted to the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board 
(KUWSDB).  Considering the enormous success of this pilot, Karnataka government has 
approved upscaling of the project to the entire population in the three cities (Ahluwalia 
and Nair, 2010).  
 
  Mixed public-private financing of urban infrastructure definitely deserves to be 
further explored in the Indian context.  At the same time, care must be taken to ensure 
that certain conditions are satisfied if this approach is to produce beneficial results. This 
approach is most likely to prove successful when projects are carefully designed and 
implemented, and when the responsible public agencies are technically and financially 
able to hold up their end of the deal.  Weak governments cannot rely on private agents to 
overcome their weaknesses and expect to make the best possible bargains for the public, 
they represent. Governments must also be careful that they do not end up assuming 
the ’downside’ risk of projects, while allowing their private partners to reap any ’upside’ 
gains.  S imilarly, care must be exerted to ensure that what occurs is not simply the 
replacement of public sector borrowing by (often more expensive) private sector 
borrowing.  Privatising the design, construction, and operation of urban infrastructure may 
have many merits if done properly, but it is neither a panacea, nor free.     37 
VIII. Concluding Remarks  
 
 
World over, cities are the central drivers of growth: they are the leading edge  of 
economic dynamism.  However, the extent to which  cities fulfil this role by promoting 
competition, galvanising innovation and accelerating growth depends critically on  the 
nature and adequacy of urban governance and finance.  Adequate finance is necessary 
to ensure satisfactory standards of infrastructure and services;  governance systems 
determine  not only the allocative and technical efficiency of spending but also the 
responsiveness and accountability with which  services  are  actually delivered.  Thus, 
good policies, efficient and responsive local governance systems and sound 
arrangements to finance public services are critical elements in sustainable urban 
development.  They shape the nature and quality of public services provided, as well as 
the structure of incentives and accountability.   
 
This paper attempts to bring out the important issues  involved in  improving 
governance systems and ensuring adequate finances to transform Indian cities into 
centres of economic dynamism.  It identifies a number of reform areas in the context of 
lessons drawn from fiscal federalism theory and experiences with governance institutions 
and financing systems around the world.   Implementation of these reforms is important 
to ensure competitive standards of urban  public services  and  effective governance 
systems that are responsive, efficient, and effective.   
 
Clearly, no one system of urban governance is likely to work equally well for all 
urban local bodies.  The governance system adopted  should  vary with the size of the 
urban local body and the nature of the institutions in the area where the local body is 
located.  The paper identifies  some key reforms required to ensure greater citizen 
participation in urban governance.  It also suggests that one possibility that should be 
considered is for the largest cities to be accorded independent status similar to the States 
in part to insulate them from localised and parochial biases.  The governance system in 
cities should  promote cosmopolitanism and  accommodative policies to promote healthy 
social and economic interactions. 
   
An important factor that determines efficiency in service delivery is clarity in 
expenditure assignment.  The paper draws attention to  existing  ambiguities in the 
assignment system and underlines the need to undertake activity mapping to ensure 
clarity.  Lack of clarity in the assignment system is not only between the states and urban 
local bodies; there are  also confusing areas of concurrence between urban local bodies 
and independent agencies delivering various services.  The introduction of a number of 
assisted  schemes from the  Centre and direct transfer of resources to the independent 
agencies delivering various services has confounded matters further.     Clear activity 
mapping and  making independent agencies  significantly  accountable  to elected 
governments in urban areas is important.  Equally important is activating the institutions 
and mechanisms mandated in the constitution for participatory planning such as District 
Planning Committees and Metropolitan Planning Committees as well as ensuring the 
meaningful functioning of Ward Committees.  
 
Financing urban infrastructure and services adequately is a formidable challenge. 
The infrastructure deficit in urban areas is not only large but growing.  In contrast, the 
resources available to urban local governments are scant.  The result is the present poor 
state of urban infrastructure and significant under-provision of municipal services.  Even   38 
in terms of the  norms fixed  as long ago as 1 963 by the  Zakaria Committee, the actual 
spending in  30 large municipal corporations in India  was less  than a quarter of their 
requirements.  Financing urban public services, therefore, is a key to imparting dynamism 
to the cities which is a necessary prerequisite for taking the economy into a double digit 
growth trajectory. 
 
The paper discusses a variety o f ways  for augmenting the resources of the 
municipal bodies in the country including essential reforms in the property tax system and 
adequate exploitation of user charges and fees for various services delivered.  The paper 
also suggests that  consideration should be given to the possibility of empowering 
metropolitan governments to piggyback on the GST when it comes into existence: even a 
1 per cent surcharge on this base could generate one and a half to twice the amount of 
revenue that is being collected f rom the property tax at present.  The paper also makes 
important recommendations for the reform of central and  State transfers to urban local 
governments. 
 
With respect to financing  urban infrastructure, development charges should be 
used more effectively  and more should also be done to utilise public lands more 
effectively.  In addition, to a considerable extent  capital expenditure requirements will 
have to be financed through borrowing.  Development of the municipal bond market is, 
therefore, an important area where much remains to be done.  Credit rating municipal 
governments, encouraging them to undertake reforms, and ensuring hard budget 
constraints are  all important for developing a healthy bond market.  Another  important 
area is to encourage public private partnerships.  The paper points out some successful 
cases of PPPs which have helped to augment water supply and solid waste management 
in municipal bodies.  It is important to involve the private sector in the provision of urban 
services to the extent feasible to ensure efficiency and accountability. 
 
Reform of urban governance and finance are critical not only to improving the 
quality of life of the people living in urban areas but also to ensure that cities, and 
especially the large metropolitan areas,  become the drivers of economic growth in the 
country.  Ensuring adequate availability of finances and improving governance is an 
imperative, and the rate at which urbanisation is taking place makes it urgent than reform 
initiatives must be undertaken.  If India is to expand its national rate of economic growth 
significantly,  concerted action  to reform both urban policies and urban  initiatives are 
required soon.   
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